Anvik Alaska Expert Witness Engineer Directory

Counsel Investigating Coverage Can be Sued for Invasion of Privacy

January 28, 2019 — Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
In Strawn v. Morris, Polich & Purdy (No. A150562, filed 1/4/19), a California appeals court held that policyholders could state a claim for invasion of privacy against an insurer’s coverage counsel and law firm, where the counsel had disseminated inadvertently produced tax returns to forensic accountants while evaluating coverage. In Strawn, a couple’s home was destroyed by fire and the husband was prosecuted for arson, but the criminal case was dropped. Notwithstanding, their insurance claim was denied on the ground that the husband intentionally set the fire and fraudulently concealed his actions. In addition to the insurance company, the insureds also named the carrier’s coverage counsel and his firm in the ensuing bad faith lawsuit, alleging causes of action for elder financial abuse and invasion of privacy. Reprinted courtesy of Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com Read the court decision
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The Proposed House Green New Deal Resolution

February 27, 2019 — Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2Gavel
A Resolution has been proposed to the House for consideration that would recognize the Federal Government’s duty “to create a Green New Deal.” It sets forth a very ambitious 10-year program to mobilize and transform every aspect of American life to combat the threats of climate change by transitioning to an economy based upon 100% clean and renewable energy. In doing so, millions of new jobs would be created, and everyone who wants a job would be guaranteed a job. The sponsors’ talking points declare that there is no time to lose, that Americans love a challenge, and “this is our moonshot.” The obvious goal is to eliminate the generation and use of fossil fuel and nuclear energy—they are simply not part of the solution. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Anthony B. Cavender, Pillsbury
Mr. Cavender may be contacted at anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com

Dealing with Abandoned Property After Foreclosure

April 10, 2019 — Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLP
California landlords must follow very specific steps before disposing of property that is clearly abandoned, left on real estate which has been the subject of court proceedings such as eviction or foreclosure, or otherwise left behind. Following the statutory procedures relating to abandoned property protects landlords from potential liability for an improper “conversion.” Former tenants/owners and others “reasonably believed” to be owners of the apparently abandoned personal property must be given proper written notice of the right to reclaim the abandoned property. The tenant is presumed to be the owner of any “records” remaining on the property. The California Code of Civil Procedure provides a template for such notice. The notice to be provided to former tenants/owners must be in “substantially” the same form provided in the California Code of Civil Procedure and must contain the following information:

A description of the abandoned property in a manner reasonably adequate to permit the owner of the property to identify it;
The location where the tenant can claim the property;
The time frame that the tenant has to claim the property. The date specified in the notice shall be a date not less than fifteen (15) days after the notice is personally delivered or, if mailed, not less than eighteen (18) days after the notice is deposited in the mail;
A statement that reasonable storage costs will be charged to the tenant/owner and the tenant/owner must pay those costs before claiming the property; and

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Reprinted courtesy of Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLP

Supreme Court Rejects “Wholly Groundless” Exception to Question of Arbitrability

February 06, 2019 — Justin Fortescue - White and Williams LLP
In newly appointed Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s first opinion, the United States Supreme Court held that the “wholly groundless” exception to arbitrability, which some federal courts had relied on as justification to decide questions of arbitrability over the express terms of a contract, was inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act and Supreme Court precedent. Based on this decision, where a contract delegates the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator, courts must respect the parties’ contract and refer the question to the arbitrator. Schein v. Archer & White, 586 U.S. __ (2019). In Schein, Archer & White brought a lawsuit against Henry Schein alleging violations of federal and state antitrust laws and seeking both monetary damages and injunctive relief. The relevant contract between the parties contained an arbitration provision that provided:

“Any dispute arising under or related to this Agreement (except for actions seeking injunctive relief . . .) shall be resolved by binding arbitration in accordance with the arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association.”

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Reprinted courtesy of Justin Fortescue, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Fortescue may be contacted at fortescuej@whiteandwilliams.com

Subcontractors Have Remedies, Even if “Pay-if-Paid” Provisions are Enforced

February 19, 2019 — John P. Ahlers - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLC
In a recent case in Kentucky[1], a sub-tier subcontractor sued the general contractor and owner for failure to pay for extra work. At the trial, the court held the subcontractor was entitled to recover under the theories of implied contracts and unjust enrichment, even though the subcontract contained a “pay-if-paid” clause. All parties appealed. In particular, the general contractor asserted that the pay-if-paid provision in the subcontract precluded recovery by the subcontractor. The issue was petitioned to the Supreme Court of Kentucky. The question to be resolved by the Supreme Court of Kentucky was whether a pay-if-paid provision was enforceable as between a general contractor and subcontractor, and if so, whether the subcontractor could nevertheless pursue the owner directly for payment notwithstanding a lack of privity between the owner and subcontractor. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of John P. Ahlers, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLC
Mr. Ahlers may be contacted at john.ahlers@acslawyers.com

Attorney's Erroneous Conclusion that Limitations Period Had Not Expired Was Not Grounds For Relief Under C.C.P. § 473(b)

February 27, 2019 — David W. Evans & Stephen J. Squillario
In Jackson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc. (2/8/19 No. A150833), the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of a motion for relief from a voluntary dismissal, without prejudice, filed by the plaintiff based on the erroneous conclusion of an attorney who she had consulted (but who had not yet appeared as counsel in her case) that the applicable statute of limitations had not yet expired. In reality, the limitations period had expired on the same date plaintiff had filed her complaint in propria persona. The plaintiff later retained the attorney on a limited basis to present the motion for relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 473(b) based on the attorney’s affidavit of fault. Therein, the attorney testified that he had advised the plaintiff to dismiss her action voluntarily based on a misinterpretation of the applicable limitations period, which the attorney characterized as having been based on his “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” Section 473 provides two distinct provisions for relief from default or dismissal – one is discretionary, while the other is mandatory. Discretionary relief is available in the case of an attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. In contrast, mandatory relief is available where the resulting dismissal was caused by an attorney’s mistake, whether or not excusable. In denying the plaintiff’s motion, the trial court reasoned that the plaintiff could not rely upon Section 473(b) because (1) the attorney did not represent the plaintiff at the time and (2) this provision did not apply to the voluntary dismissal of an action without prejudice. Reprinted courtesy of David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and Stephen J. Squillario, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com Mr. Squillario may be contacted at ssquillario@hbblaw.com Read the court decision
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EPA Issues Interpretive Statement on Application of NPDES Permit System to Releases of Pollutants to Groundwater

May 27, 2019 — Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2Gavel
On Tuesday, April 23, 2019, in a development of interest to practically anyone who operates a plant or business, EPA published its Interpretive Statement in the Federal Register. (See 84 FR 16810 (April 23, 2019).) After considering the thousands of comments it received in response to a February 20, 2018, Federal Register notice, EPA has concluded that “the Clean Water Act (CWA) is best read as excluding all releases of pollutants from a point source to groundwater from a point source from NPDES program coverage, regardless of a hydrological connection between the groundwater and jurisdictional surface water.” Acknowledging that its past public statements have not been especially consistent or unambiguous on this important matter, EPA states that this interpretation “is the best, if not the only reading of the CWA, is more consistent with Congress’ intent than other interpretations of the Act, and best addresses the question of NPDES permit program applicability for pollutant releases to groundwater within the authority of the CWA.” Indeed, the absence of “a dedicated statement on the best reading of the CWA has generated confusion in the courts, and uncertainly for EPA regional offices and states implementing the NPDES program, regulated entities, and the public.” The recent and contrary interpretations of this issue by the Ninth Circuit (Hawaii Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737) and the Fourth Circuit (Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, LP, 887 F.3d 637) will be reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court, which will now have the benefit of the agency’s official position. In addition, EPA discloses that it will be soliciting additional public “input” on how it can best provide the regulated community with “further clarity and regulatory certainly”; these comments will be due within 45 days (June 7, 2019). Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Anthony B. Cavender, Pillsbury
Mr. Cavender may be contacted at anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com

Subcontractor Entitled to Defense for Defective Work Causing Property Damage Beyond Its Scope of Work

May 27, 2019 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
The Illinois Court of Appeals found the subcontractor was owed a defense for alleged property damage caused by its faulty workmanship, but outside its scope of work. Acuity Ins. Co. v. 950 W. Huron Condo. Ass'n, 2019 Ill. App. LEXIS 208 (Ill. Ct. App. March 29, 2019). The condominium association sued its general contractor, Belgravia, for alleged defects allowing water to infiltrate and cause damage. Belgravia filed a third-party complaint against its subcontractors, including the carpentry subcontractor Denk & Roche. Denk & Roche held a CGL policy with two insurers during the relevant period, one with Cincinnati Insurance Company for the period January 1, 2000 through June 1, 2007, and another with Acuity Insurance Company, effective June 1, 2007, through December 31, 2013. Denk & Roche tendered its defense to both insurers. Cincinnati agreed to defend and contributed to a settlement of the AOAO's claims. Acuity denied a defense, contending that the underlying claims did not trigger a duty to defend. Acuity's declaratory judgment suit sought a determination that it had no duty to defend. Cincinnati intervened and argued it was entitled to equitable contribution from Acuity. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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